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In two decades, Morocco’s large cities experienced dramatic changes. In 2009, the weekly magazine TelQuel referred to a veritable “urban revolution” following the launch of several 
megaprojects in cities like Tangiers, Casablanca and the capital 
Rabat.1 Exemplary flagship projects are Tanger Med, a deep-
water port facility aspiring to become a nodal point for global 
maritime trade and a major hub of containerized transport; 
Casablanca Marina, a new skyscraper complex with offices and 
luxury residences redesigning the beachfront of the metropole 
between the Casa–Port train station and the magnificent Hassan 
II mosque; and the Bouregreg project, the largest urban renewal 
undertaking in the history of the country developing exclusive 
real estate, shopping malls, marinas and state-of-the-art cultural 
facilities along the estuary between Rabat and Salé. Together, 
these projects are radically transforming Morocco’s cityscapes.
Compared to other countries in North Africa, Morocco 
is a trendsetter in megaprojects.2 The regime envisions the 
country as connecting European capital networks with Africa, 
the Middle East and potentially Asia and the United States. 
The strategy of boosting the competitiveness of Morocco’s 
metropolitan areas reflects the country’s ambitions for global 
market integration. Under King Mohammed VI, urban 
megaprojects and large-scale infrastructural works came to 
characterize a shift toward “urban entrepreneurialism”: the 
increasingly autonomous and entrepreneurial role of cities in 
the extraction and creation of surplus value within an increas-
ingly competitive global market.
Promenade along the Bouregreg river, Rabat, 2016. MONICA GUMM/LAIF/REDUX
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Urban megaprojects, however, are only part of the story. 
From the beginning of his reign, Mohammed VI prioritized 
not only spectacular urban growth strategies involving land 
and property investment but also ambitious social develop-
ment initiatives and poverty alleviation programs. A salient 
example is the Cities Without Slums (CWS) program 
launched in 2004. This nationwide slum eradication program 
offered a direct response to the urban crisis dramatically 
exposed by the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 
that killed more than 40 people. All the suicide bombers came 
from Sidi Moumen, a slum area on the eastern periphery 
of Casablanca. The events strengthened the idea that the 
country’s neglect of its urban poor created a breeding ground 
for domestic terrorism. The attacks also undercut the city’s 
“unique selling proposition” and its image as a safe destination 
for investment.
These two kinds of urban projects bring to light the 
political practices that connect countries like Morocco to 
processes of globalization and illuminate how global capi-
talism is produced in cities such as Casablanca, Tangiers 
and Rabat. The transformation of the Moroccan city tells a 
broader story about the transformation of the state and the 
economy through neoliberal reform. Economic liberalization 
promised to undermine the power structures of authoritarian 
states, but in fact authoritarianism has persisted in new 
globalized forms.
A Shift in Ruling Power and Practice
Morocco’s urban entrepreneurialism emerged not from an 
implementation of textbook reforms. Rather, the move was part 
of a longer-term and contingent process of profound societal 
and political change, one that has been continuously adjusted 
in response to new challenges and problems. The origins of 
Morocco’s urban revolution date to the early 1980s. Like many 
countries in the Global South, Morocco faced a severe debt 
crisis and was forced to adopt a structural adjustment program 
pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank in 1983.
These structural reforms posed some serious challenges to 
the ruling establishment. Privatization, market deregulation 
and fiscal discipline undermined the ability of state institu-
tions to control both society and the economy. Austerity and 
structural adjustment had an immediate and devastating 
effect on poverty and social inequality, which contributed to 
numerous outbreaks of violence throughout the 1980s in the 
form of urban riots. These two factors threatened the position 
of the monarchy and its entourage. The gradual rethinking of 
the urban economy, in part through the launch of megaprojects 
and the implementation of new social programs, emerged in 
response to this new social and economic reality of structural 
adjustment and economic liberalization.3 In this context, the 
Moroccan city constitutes both a class project and a govern-
mental problem. The goal is to generate economic growth and 
maintain political order through new strategies and techniques 
of accumulation, domination and population management.
The ruling elites in Morocco adapted to the new reality but 
also participated in its construction. The state sold economic 
assets at bargain prices and adopted neoliberal policies, assuring 
the future of the Moroccan bourgeoisie.4 Morocco’s elites who 
had occupied privileged positions in the state administration 
now made fortunes in the private sector. The royal family led 
by example. King Hassan II, for example, took control of 
Omnium Nord Africain—the largest private conglomerate in 
the country—from its French owners. The takeover signified an 
expansion of the monarchy’s activities from the conventional 
state-institutional realm of the parliament and the ministries 
to the private realm of business and market control. Today, 
King Mohammed VI is the country’s preeminent capitalist.
As neoliberal reforms created the conditions for new 
capitalist class relations alongside older neo-patrimonial and 
clientelist practices, the city became the privileged site for the 
elaboration of some of these new strategies. Neoliberal policies 
allowed the ruling elite to regain “in the private sector the influ-
ence that policies of economic liberalization were progressively 
eroding in government and the public sector.”5 Massive invest-
ments in real estate and slum-upgrading projects opened new 
opportunities for a privatized housing sector and influential 
individuals like Anas Sefroui, CEO of Addoha, and Alami 
Lazraq, CEO of Alliances, two of Morocco’s largest real estate 
companies. Neoliberal reforms also allowed the ruling elite 
to reinforce external political relationships, as the economic 
restructuring strengthened the position of foreign (particularly 
French) investors in the domestic market. The already strong 
relations between the French political elite and the monarchy 
allowed French multinationals like Bouygues and Alstom to 
acquire a dominant position in the Moroccan economy.
Urban projects in Morocco were profoundly shaped by the 
ways in which the interests of capital converged with security 
concerns and the problem of cities prone to riots. Cities were 
brought to the forefront in the construction of a new social 
order both as privileged spaces for capital accumulation and 
land commodification, as well as laboratories for the develop-
ment of new modalities of government, social control and 
political domination.
Consequently, there is a political symbiosis between urban 
megaprojects and social initiatives such as Cities Without 
Slums. While the first are directly concerned with opening 
places to the global market, the second are concerned with 
the transformation of urban life itself—especially the lives of 
the urban poor who have a historical record of social protest 
and urban violence—and its adaptation to the new conditions 
brought forth by neoliberal globalization.
The City as a Class Project
In the Bouregreg river valley between Rabat and Salé lies a 
project that illustrates the tendency to prioritize the exchange 
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value of the city (how to sell the city) over its use value (how 
to make the best possible city for its citizens). The valley is 
being transformed from a dumping ground and relatively 
degraded space into a modern urban center connecting two 
historic urban rivals: the bourgeois administrative capital and 
seat of the ruling class, and its neighbor depicted as plagued 
by urban poverty, informal housing and Islamist opposition. 
Launched in 2006, the Bouregreg project exploits the valley’s 
strategic location and historic cultural resources such as the 
Hassan tower and the casbah of the Oudayas. The project 
encompasses a territory of 6,000 hectares alongside the 
Bouregreg riverbanks to be developed in six phases. The first 
two phases, relatively advanced, include the construction of 
luxury residences, hotels, marinas, commercial centers, an 
archeological museum and the Grand Theatre, designed by 
the late “starchitect” Zaha Hadid. The fluid sculptural form 
of the theatre, inspired by the movement of the river itself, is 
intended to serve as a new landmark for the city. The project 
also includes infrastructural works such as the new Moulay 
Hassan bridge, two tramlines, a tunnel underneath the 
historic casbah and a new ring highway to improve mobility 
between the two cities.
The planning and design of a new urban dream world in 
the valley not only evidences the aesthetic transformation of 
Moroccan cities but also sheds light on changes in decision-
making and state power. To realize this project, the state 
created the Agency for the Development of the Bouregreg 
Valley through Law 16–04. The Agency has exclusive authority 
over the project within its 6,000 hectare territorial bound-
aries, overseeing land previously under the jurisdiction of 
prefectures, local municipalities and the Rabat–Salé Urban 
Planning Agency. The Agency is authorized to develop zoning 
plans, organize public inquiries, provide public infrastructure, 
allocate land for construction, deliver construction permits, 
regulate all deeds of sale and expropriate private land deemed 
necessary for the project. All state-owned land was transferred 
to the Agency free of charge.
The Bouregreg Agency also operates as an intermediary 
between foreign investors and the Moroccan political scene. 
It attracts investors, such as the Abu Dhabi–based real estate 
The Casablanca marina, 2017. KOENRAAD BOGAERT
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company Eagle Hills or the sovereign wealth fund Wessal 
Capital and gives them decision-making power. The Agency 
adopts plans, goals and strategies that best serve the interests 
of foreign investors. The original plan for the first phase of the 
Bouregreg project included the construction of a public space 
and green esplanade with palm trees in front of the medina of 
Salé where citizens could stroll and picnic. To increase private 
investor profit, however, that portion of the plan was eventually 
replaced with a gated community.
Urban planning and government thus become more 
accountable to investors and markets than to citizens. Long-
term policy agendas have been deferred in favor of placating 
potential investors. Even if local authorities were to become 
more democratically accountable, democracy has been short-
circuited by institutional arrangements like the Bouregreg 
Agency. Citizens have little capacity to influence the projects 
that are reshaping their own cities.
The creation of such an agency represents more than just 
a shift in state power from the national level to the city. The 
global elites involved in local politics do not so much weaken 
state authority as become active players within these new 
state agencies. In this sense, authoritarianism in Morocco 
was not undermined by economic liberalization; it was 
re-institutionalized and rescaled, with power shared with 
new global actors.
The manipulation of land and public resources through 
megaprojects like the Bouregreg development—not only 
in Morocco but in cities globally—has resulted in urban 
space being controlled with little public transparency. 
Social groups who would be otherwise welcome if these 
spaces were publicly owned and democratically controlled 
are finding themselves excluded. The luxury apartments, 
the higher prices for consumer goods, the guards outside 
the fences that surround the first phase of the Bouregreg 
project—situated next to the ancient medina of Salé and its 
primarily poorer residents—make clear that this new urban 
center is not meant for ordinary citizens. While the project 
may transform the Bouregreg valley into a globalized space, 
that space is not accessible or affordable to those who live 
in its immediate surroundings.
The Bouregreg project is not an isolated example. Moroccan 
authoritarianism has been transformed by the intertwining 
of the interests of ruling domestic elites and global economic 
actors. Whereas Hassan II ruled with an iron hand, Mohamed 
VI rules via holdings, funds and new state agencies. The result 
is not less authoritarianism, but rather authoritarianism with 
a different face: new institutions, new planning methods and 
new (global) relations of power.
The City as a Governmental Problem
Urban spectacles like the Bouregreg project do not take place 
in a social vacuum. Developers rarely have the opportunity 
to design cities from scratch. Already existing urban life, its 
movement, its connections and its particular interests and 
desires can pose considerable problems and even threats from 
the viewpoint of those in power. Urban planning is thus largely 
a problem of government. Given international attention to 
human rights and democracy promotion, state repression 
of urban life can potentially compromise a country’s desired 
global image.
Indeed, poverty and slums pose considerable challenges for 
urban class projects. In response to the disruptive moment of 
debt relief, structural adjustment and the coinciding riots in 
the early 1980s, Moroccan authorities reverted to repressive 
methods in the name of securitizing the urban territory. These 
methods, however, have proven ineffective in resolving the 
enduring economic crisis or consolidating the neoliberal transi-
tion. Authorities needed to integrate the so-called dangerous 
classes into the new neoliberal social order.
The Cities Without Slums program launched in 2004 stands 
as an example. In contrast to the more top-down methods 
of slum upgrading of the 1980s, the new program symbol-
ized a shift from repression to integration. Inscribed into 
the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations, 
CWS promoted principles such as participation, consent and 
economic empowerment through home ownership. Many 
national and international observers believed that the CWS 
program demonstrated the commitment of the monarchy to 
the ideals of social inclusion, good governance and participa-
tory development.
The program targeted 362,000 households spread across 
more than 1,000 shantytowns (bidonvilles) in 85 cities and 
towns. The cost was estimated to be 25 billion Moroccan 
dirhams ($2.62 billion), of which 10 billion was funded 
by the state via the Solidarity Fund for Housing. The state 
offered 3,500 hectares of public land to the project for sums 
far below market price. Authorities set up public-private 
partnerships and acted as guarantors for beneficiaries’ debts 
with commercial banks. Some 80  percent of the slum-
upgrading operations involved resettlement, often to the 
peripheries of the city. In addition to state support, CWS is 
also funded by international agencies such as the World Bank, 
the European Investment Bank and the French Development 
Agency. USAID and other organizations provided expertise 
and technical assistance. In May 2018, 59 cities were declared 
slum-free,6 involving a total of 277,583 resettled households.7
Most observers consider the program to have failed 
to fulfill its social promises. Instead of reducing poverty, 
it merely relocated poverty to the urban peripheries. 
Nevertheless, the program was politically significant for 
other reasons. First, CWS symbolized a changing relation-
ship between those who govern and the governed and 
among the governed themselves. The program furthered 
the replacement of the social contract of the post-colonial 
developmental state in which citizens garnered certain 
social privileges and rights (e.g., public employment) in 
exchange for their loyalty to the regime, with one that 
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promotes self-responsibility and encourages citizens to seize 
the opportunities of the free market. Through the fostering 
of home ownership, the facilitation of access to credit 
and the integration of informal housing into the formal 
market, CWS attempted to create a more self-reliant and 
entrepreneurial citizen. A new method of social engineering, 
called accompagnement social, has sought to gain the trust 
of slum dwellers by increasing their participation in the 
resettlement operation. Small teams on the ground organize 
information sessions, provide administrative and financial 
assistance and accompany the beneficiary through their 
move to a new location.
The program aims to achieve “sustained behavioral change.” 
According to a document by Al Omrane, the leading public 
operator behind CWS, “access to ownership allows slum 
dwellers to improve their living conditions and induces a new 
social behavior.”8 The goal is to transform the informal urban 
poor into consuming, taxpaying and indebted homeowners. 
According to program officials, once people are turned into 
indebted consumers, they will become responsible citizens 
with a proper job and a proper lifestyle.9 CWS illustrates 
how authorities require slum dwellers to participate in the 
making of a political world in which civic rights and social 
justice are circumscribed not only by the regime but also by 
the sanctions and incentives of the free market.10
The CWS program serves a second and related objective by 
giving authorities more bureaucratic control over a popula-
tion perceived to be a threat. CWS enabled authorities to 
break up previously impenetrable urban neighborhoods 
characterized by the crisscross of shanties and unpaved 
narrow alleys. Slum dwellers were rehoused in new, more 
governable social housing blocs. According to a Moroccan 
Ministry of Housing manual, the added value of new 
rehousing practices developed by CWS was the “improve-
ment of the quality of information [on the slum dwellers] 
available to the decision-makers.”11
Finally, the CWS program also reconfigured the Moroccan 
economy by providing the regulatory framework and official 
support for the setup of public-private partnerships and the 
attraction of private investment in the housing sector. As 
such, it unlocked forms of capital previously inaccessible to 
the market, including both public property and the slum 
dwellers’ informal economic arrangements. Authorities 
intended poverty alleviation schemes in Morocco not only 
to prevent radicalization and enhance governmental control, 
but also to open new frontiers for profit and the exploitation 
of what Ananya Roy calls “poverty capital.”12
Toward a Globalized Authoritarianism?
Urban spectacles like the Bouregreg project and social initia-
tives like the CWS program were instrumental in burnishing 
the image of Moroccan exceptionalism characterized by good 
governance, social inclusion, participatory development 
and authoritarian moderation. Particularly during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, Morocco’s urban revolu-
tion sought to present a new Morocco led by Mohammed 
VI, a benevolent monarch with a clear economic vision and 
a caring heart for the disadvantaged. This image contrasted 
sharply with the authoritarian depiction of King Hassan II.
This narrative of a Moroccan exception, of course, has 
been challenged in recent years, given the crackdown on 
independent journalism and the ongoing repression of 
revolts in the Rif region and elsewhere.13 Yet, the critique 
of Moroccan exceptionalism focuses almost exclusively on 
the apparent resurfacing of repressive methods of political 
rule, while some of the very reforms that gave rise to the 
exceptionalist narrative remain unscrutinized. Rather than 
understanding Morocco as an authoritarian regime gradually 
incorporating liberal and social reforms that could form 
the basis for a genuine process of political liberalization,14 
recent Moroccan urban reforms are part of a qualitative 
transformation of authoritarian rule toward a globalized 
authoritarianism better adapted to the reality of neoliberal 
global markets.
In the process, the Moroccan city is turning into an 
entrepreneurial city where decision-making processes are 
breaking loose from conventional political entities and 
poor urban life is being transformed and integrated into 
a new market-based ecosystem. Under pressure to democ-
ratize and respect human rights, political authority and 
decision-making power has been increasingly concentrated 
in exceptional zones like the Bouregreg valley, where state 
power becomes allied with global capital and political 
control over the urban poor has been extended through 
market mechanisms and new governmental techniques 
alongside traditional coercive forms. ■
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